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asset." The transactions giving rise to the losses in Seed and Finch were
neither sales nor exchanges.
It appears, however, that the particular line of reasoning adopted
will have no limiting effect upon the amount of loss to be deducted.
Under both explanations the deduction, if allowed, will be allowed in
full as an ordinary loss in the year of abandonment. Thus it seems that
the question as to the type of loss raised no problem, and was properly
ignored in the opinions.
As a consequence of Seed, there should be a relaxation of the
stringent requirements of Parker. A taxpayer, with proper advice,
should be less apprehensive from the tax standpoint about entering
into a bona fide transaction for profit. For, if careful investigations are
undertaken, detailed plans prepared, certain tentative commitments
procured, and the only remaining condition prior to actual operation
is beyond the taxpayer's control, then it seems that a subsequent failure
of the final condition to materialize should allow the taxpayer to take
a loss deduction under section 165(c)(2). Such a policy should ultimately result in increased revenues by encouraging and stimulating
sound investment and commercial and industrial growth, when expensive preparation losses can be partially offset by this tax loss relief.
JOHN COOPER LANE

CREDIT CARD LIABILITY: NO EXPRESS
RISK-ALLOCATION PROVISION OR NEGLIGENCE
The advent of our credit card economy has created a troublesome
problem for the courts in that they must determine who should bear
the loss for unauthorized purchases as between the credit card issuer
and -the authorized cardholder. In the past, courts have assessed liability on the bases of either an express risk-allocation clause in the credit
agreement or the failure by one of the parties to perform a duty imposed by the credit card relationship.' In the recent case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke,2 which involved the issue of liability for unauthorized purchases, the Supreme Court of Texas was faced with a
"For a detailed discussion of the relationships involved see Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, ig VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1965); Murray, A LegalEmpirical Study of the :Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAmi L. REv.
811 (1967); Robinson, New Developments in Retail Financing, 8 KAN. L. REv. 554
(196o); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant, 48
CALIF. L. Rav. 459 (ig6o).
-441 S.W.2d 521 (rex. 1969).
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novel factual situation. There was no risk-allocation clause in the bipartite credit agreement. 3 Furthermore, negligence could not be attributed to either party.
Duke, a Texas resident, had received his Sears "identification
card" 4 in ig6o. He had never signed the card in the space provided for
the authorized signature. 5 While Duke was in New York on a business
trip in December, 1965, his card was stolen without his knowledge. It
was then used to make purchases at Sears stores in New York and New
Jersey. 6 Two weeks after the theft, Duke discovered that his card was
missing7 and promptly sent a written cancellation notice to Sears.
Thereafter he refused to pay for the unauthorized purchases of more
than $1,3oo. Sears then filed suit against Duke based on the "Sears
Revolving Charge Account Agreement," signed by him, which in part
provided:
In consideration of your selling merchandise to me on Sears revolving Charge Account, I agree to the following regarding all
3A bipartite credit card arrangement involves a contract or agreement between
the issuer-seller and the cardholder. An example is the department store credit
card agreement whereby the issuer's card is valid only for charges at the issuer's
stores. By comparison, a tripartite credit card arrangement is one which involves
a contract between the issuer, who may or may not be a seller, and the cardholder. Such an arrangement also involves contracts between the issuer and
various retail merchants, or dealers, whereby the issuer agrees to purchase the
amount of their credit card sales on a weekly or monthly basis. This arrangement is exemplified by the oil company credit cards, The Diner's Club, Carte
Blanche, etc. For a more thorough analysis of the credit card system see Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the
Law of Contractsand Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1o51 (1965); Murray, A LegalEmperical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MiAmi L. REv.
811 (1967); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction: A Legal Infant,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 459 (ig6o).
'Throughout the record the cardholder's stolen credit card was referred to
as his Sears "identification card." No attempt at a distinction between the two
will be made in this comment. However, when the case was before the court
of civil appeals, Justice Moore in his dissent protested to the majority's use of
the term "credit card" when there was no mention made of such an instrument
in the Sears credit agreement. Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 433 S.W.2d 919,
927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
5
Duke could not recall at the trial whether or not he had ever used his
unsigned card to make purchases at Sears. Id. at 921.
'While several minor items were charged, numerous expensive purchases
were also made. However, only four of the sixty-four charge slips in evidence
indicated that any identification other than the presentation of the credit card
might have been required of the imposter. Id. at 924-25.
7Duke did not discover that his card was missing until the Sears store in
Lubbock, Texas, where his account was located, called to inquire about the
"excess activity" of his account. Id. at 922.
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purchases made by8 me or on my Sears revolving Charge Account
identification ....
In the trial court, judgment was rendered for Sears after the jury
had absolved both Sears and Duke of any negligence. 9 When the judgment was appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, that court, relying
on the terms of the credit agreement, also held Duke liable for the unauthorized purchases, 0 and the Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the
appellate court's decision in the present action."'
Sears bases Duke's liability for the unauthorized purchases upon
"the construction of the words of the credit agreement .... '12 The
court construed the agreement to mean that "Duke will pay for all
sales made by Sears to a purchaser identifying himself by the use of
the credit card .. ."8 Duke took the position that this interpretation
was unwarranted. He argued that if Sears had wanted to bind him to
sSears, Roebuck &:Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 522 (rex. 1969). The credit
application then set forth certain terms and conditions with respect to the amount
of monthly payments, together with a schedule of an interest charges thereon.
As of September, 1969, the credit application had changed somewhat. It is now
entitled "Sears Revolving Charge Account and Security Agreement" and provides:
In consideration of your selling merchandise and services for personal,
family or household purposes to me on my Sears Revolving Charge Account, I agree to the following regarding all purchases made by me or on
my Sears Revolving Charge Account Identification ....
'On the basis of the evidence, the jury found that: (i) all the charges in
question were made on Duke's credit card, but not by him personally and not
upon his authorization; (2) Duke's card was either lost or stolen; (3) he had failed
to sign it, but this was not negligence; (4) Duke did not fail to use ordinary care
to prevent the loss or theft of his card; (5) Duke did not fail to discover and
report the loss or theft of the card within a reasonable time; (6) Sears did not
fail to use ordinary care in ascertaining the identity and authority of the person
using Duke's card; and (7) the reasonable charge for the merchandise in question
was $1,335.77. Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 433 S.W.2d 919, 922 (rex. Civ. App.
1968).
"°Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 433 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). The
court of civil appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on an
evidence question. The court did not believe sufficient evidence existed to support
the jury's finding that Sears discharged its duty of care in regard to all of the
unauthorized purchases. Id. at 925. The court of civil appeals also held that Sears
had failed to carry the burden of proving that it did not fail to use ordinary
care to ascertain the identity and authority of the person presenting Duke's
credit card. Id.
nThe supreme court, however, reversed the court of appeals on the evidence
question, stating:
what court has incorrectly placed the burden of proof upon Sears and
has further enlarged the burden on Sears by holding that it could not
discharge its duty of care by accepting the credit card as the only proof
of identity.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. g6g).
"Id. at 523.
"Isd.
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pay for unauthorized purchases, it should have expressly stated this
either in the credit agreement or on the card.' 4 The court briefly dismissed Duke's contention by holding that the language of the credit
agreement did, in fact, bind him to pay for unauthorized purchases.
It then added that "we do not regard this result to be so surprising in
this credit card age."lU On the contrary, such a result seems somewhat
surprising in comparison with other pertinent credit card cases.
In the brief history of credit card liability'16 less than a score of reported cases exist.17 In most of these cases the liability for unauthoriz"tThere was no contractual language on the Sears credit card. On the front
of this card appeared Duke's name in raised letters, his account number, and
the code number assigned to the issuing store in Lubbock, Texas. On the back
of each card was a space for the holder's signature under which was the statement:
"'Valid When Signed By Authorized Purchaser.' Also, at various places on the
back of the cards were the statements: 'Property of Sears, Roebuck And Co.';
'Returnable Upon Request'; and 'Report Loss Or Theft Of Card To Credit Office.'"
Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 433 S.V.2d 919, 921 (rex. Civ. App. 1968).
25Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 523 ('rex. 1969).
'5 The first case was Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct.
1915), where a credit "token" rather than a credit card was actually involved.
These early tokens or coins did not contain the contractual language now on most
credit cards. Usually only the name and account number of the customer were
imprinted upon the token. Murray, A Legal-EmpiricalStudy of the Unauthorized
'Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MiAmi L. REv. 811, 814 (1967).
u1Sindair Ref. Co. v. Consolidated Van & Storage Cos., 192 F. Supp. 87 (N.D.
Ga. 196o); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Ala. App. 5o6, 214 So. 2d 857,
cert. denied, 293 Ala. 717, 214 So. 2d 861 (1968); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing
Co., 2o8 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945); Thomas v. Central Charge Serv., Inc.,
212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965); Read v. Gulf Oil Corp., 114 Ga. App. 21,
i5o S.E.2d 359 (1966); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Waters, 159 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct.
App. 1963); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762 (La. Ct. App. 1962);
Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833, 36 S.W.2d 681 (Kansas Ct. App. 1931);
Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Socony Mobil Oil
Co. v. Greif, 1o App. Div. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S.2d 522 ('96o); Uni Serv Corp. v.
Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 967); Allied Stores,
Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967);
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1962), aff'd per curiam, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. T. 1963); Union
Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (196o); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24
Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. Lancaster County 1934); Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa.
Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d
881 ('rex. Civ. App. 1943).
The relatively small number of cases is attributable to several factors: (1) the
low percentage of defaults or misuse in the past; (2) the small size of most individual credit accounts would make profitable collection by suit very difficult, thus
credit card suits usually involve relatively large amounts; (3) the issuers want to
maintain good will with the public and attempt to avoid a suit which would or
could result in bad publicity. Claflin, The Credit Card-A New Instrument, 33
CoNN. B.J. 1 (959); 35 NoTRE DAME LAw. 225 (196o.
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ed purchases has been determined by a finding of negligence,' 8 lack of
good faith, 19 or by application of the doctrine of estoppel. 20 Only two
cases before Sears have placed liability upon the cardholder merely by
2
a strict interpretation of a credit agreement. '
The Texas case of Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan22 was the
first to base its decision on a strict interpretation of the credit agreement. The defendant-cardholder loaned his card to two men for the
purpose of making purchases on his behalf. The card was used by one
of the men to make additional purchases for which the holder refused
to pay. The court held the cardholder liable on the basis of the contractual provision printed on the card. The provision stated that the
holder would be "responsible for all purchases made by use of this
card, prior to its surrender to the issuing oil company, whether or not
such purchases are made by the named holder.. . ."2 The court concluded the holder's retention and use of the card constituted an acceptance of its terms, and, therefore, he was bound by its express pro24
visions.
A similar contractual provision was present on the holder's credit
card in Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein.25 It provided that the cardholder
"assumes full responsibility for all purchases made hereunder by any
one through the use of this credit card" prior to surrendering the card
to the issuer or giving written notice of its loss or theft.20 The New
York court noted that this risk-allocation provision satisfied the re"1E.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. Lancaster County
1934).
29E.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790
(1945); cf. Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 22o Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
mE.g., Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Consolidated Van 8=Storage Cos., 192 F. Supp. 87
(N.D. Ga. 196o); Neiman-Marcus Go. v. Viser, 14o So. 2d 762 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
"Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1962); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (rex. Civ. App.
1943). Cf. Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1967).
268 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
=1d.
241d. at 881-82. It is generally held that acceptance of a document which
purports to be a contract constitutes assent to the terms contained therein. 3 A.
CoRBIN, CONTRArS § 607 (1960); 1 S. WILLISTON, CoIRmAcrs § 90 A (3 d ed. 1957);
RErSATMErNT or CoNTRAcrs § 70 (1932). See 63 HtAsv. L. REv. 494 (1950). The
criterion for invoking this general rule is whether a reasonably prudent man
would have seen the fine print terms. 1 S. WILLISTON, CoNRAcTrs § go C (3d ed.
1957)234 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1962), aff'd per
curiam, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. T. 1963).
"229 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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quirements of an applicable state statute27 and constituted "an original
undertaking in which the [cardholder] made it his own responsibility
for any use of the card." 28 In placing liability upon the cardholder, the
court observed that the contract provisions were not unreasonable.
The cardholder assumed the risk of all loss before giving notice of the
loss or theft of the card, and the issuer assumed the risk after receipt of
29
notice.
It should be emphasized that tripartite credit arrangements were
involved in the Magnolia and Texaco cases. Therefore, it might be considered whether the existence of a bipartite credit arrangement, such
as that in Sears, would lead the courts to a different conclusion. It
would appear that a bipartite credit arrangement should impose a
higher standard of care upon the issuer since he, and not an intermediate dealer or agent, is directly involved in all transactions. 30
Prior to Sears, only one bipartite credit card case discussed the issue
of contractual liability for unauthorized purchases. 31 The New York
court in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke 2 dealt with facts very similar to those in Sears. The defendant-cardholder signed a credit application in which she agreed:
i.-To pay for all purchases made by any person presenting the
identification plate which Seller will lend me, until Seller receives my notice by certified mail that the same has been lost
or stolen.as
-NW.Y.GEN. Bus. LAw § 512 (McKinney 1968):
A provision to impose liability on an obligor for... use of a credit card
after its loss or theft is effective only if is conspicuously written or printed
in a size at least equal to eight point bold type either on the card, or on
a writing accompanying the card when issued or on the obligor's application for the card, and then only until written notice of the loss or theft is
given to the issuer.
1229 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
'Id. at 55"Three recent cases suggest that a bipartite credit arrangement may impose
higher standards upon the issuer than would be the case in a tripartite situation.
See Rayor v. Affiliated Credit Bureau, Inc., - Colo. -, 455 P.2d 859 (1969); Allied
Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1967); Uni Serv Corp. v. Vitiello, 53 Misc. 2d 396, 278 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Civ.

Ct. 1967).

"Allied Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1967). Bipartite credit arrangements have confronted the courts in
early credit card cases, but no contractual agreement was present between the
issuer-seller and the cardholder. See Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 225 Mo. App. 833,
36 S.W.2d 681 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1931); Lit Bros. v. Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658,
121 A. x3i (Sup. Ct. 1923); Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun.
Ct. 1915).
='52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
3277 N.Y.S.2d at io.
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The card was subsequently stolen without the knowledge or negligence of the cardholder. Since she was unaware of the theft, the holder
was unable to give the notice required by the credit application and
the applicable New York statute. 34 Upon these facts the court refused
to hold the cardholder liable for the unauthorized purchases which resulted. It held that both the bipartite credit agreement and the statute
were ambiguous and did not "expressly provide that the holder assumes all risk occasioned by loss or theft of the credit card where the
credit card holder is unaware of such facts and thus is unable to give
the required notice."3 5
It is significant that the statute3 6 held to be ambiguous and inapplicable to the bipartite agreement in Allied was the same statute
which was invoked to place liability on the cardholder in the tripartite
arrangement in Texaco. The Allied court's refusal to be constrained
by the Texaco precedent was apparently based upon the fact that "a
modest two-party arrangement" was involved, as opposed to the broad
tripartite arrangement in Texaco.37 Thus, it seems that Allied imposes
a higher standard upon the bipartite issuer, at least in the drafting of
the credit agreement.
Sears cannot easily be reconciled with the decisions in Magnolia,
Texaco, or Allied. Both Magnolia and Texaco required only that the
cardholders read the express risk-allocation clauses in the agreements
to be informed of the extent of their liability. Since neither the Sears
agreement nor the credit card 38 contains a similiar express provision,
Sears places an additional duty on the cardholder to construe correctly
his liability from the comparatively ambiguous wording of the credit
agreement. 39 Furthermore, the wording of the agreement fails to meet
"N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1968).
35277 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. The court went on to hold that while the cardholder
must meet the duty of reasonable care in retaining and using the card, a concurrent obligation existed on the part of the issuer-seller to protect the holder
from the imposition of unjust charges, and that the issuer had failed to meet
this obligation.
It has been argued that the Allied court's holding concerning the contractual
liability of the parties has virtually nullified the effectiveness of the New York
statute in birpartite situations. Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 811, 817 (1967).
"N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 512 (McKinney 1968).
3'277 N.Y.S.2d at 14.

"8As to the language on the credit card, see note 14 supra.
"Compare the following pertinent contract provisions which have confronted
the courts in several other credit card cases with the language of the Sears agreement:
Acceptance by [the holder] implies responsibility for all service and mer-
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the stringent criterion laid down in Allied. The extent of the liability
imposed by the Sears agreement is left unclear by the omission of an
express risk-allocation provision concerning loss, theft, or liability40
until-notice.
In denying the liability of the cardholder for unauthorized purchases, the Allied court did not stray from well-established contract
principles. It strictly adhered to the rule that the courts will not attempt, under the guise of construction or interpretation, to make a
new contract for the parties.41 Neither will they change a written contract so as to make it express an intention of the parties different from
that expressed in the words of the instrument.4 2 In Sears the court
appears to ignore these contract principles. By implying promises of
liability on the part of the cardholder which are not expressed, the
chandise obtained thereby. Loss or theft hereof must be reported in writing
immediately to avoid responsibility for unauthorized use.
Read v. Gulf Oil Corp., 114 Ga. App. 21, 150 S.E.2d 319, 320 (1966).
This credit card confirms the authorization of credit during the period
shown, to the person...whose name is embossed on the reverse side
thereof. Such person ... assumes full responsibility for all purchases made
hereunder by any one through the use of this credit card prior to surrendering it to the company or to give the company notice in writing
that the card has been lost or stolen. Retention of this card or use
thereof constitutes acceptance of all terms and conditions thereof.
Texaco, Inc. v. Goldstein, 34 Misc. 2d 751, 229 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1962), aff'd per curiam, 39 Misc. 2d 552, 241 N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. T. 1963).
The customer to whom this card is issued guarantees payment... of price
of products delivered or services rendered to anyone presenting this card,
guarantee to continue until card is surrendered or written notice is received
by the company that it is lost or stolen.
Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243, 245 (196o).
The named holder shall be responsible for all purchases made by use of
this card, prior to its surrender to the issuing company, whether or not
such purchases are made by the named holder or into the car described.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Irex. Civ. App. 1943).
"Compare Allied Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d
8, 12 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967) with Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521,
522 (Tex. 1969).
"'E.g., New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891);
Haltom Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3o4 F.2d 95 ( 5 th Cir. 1962); Pennsylvania
Fire Ins. Co. v. Malone, 217 Ala. 168, 115 So. 156 (1928); Spry v. Williams, 82 Iowa
61, 47 N.W. 89o (1891); Chaffer v. Chaffer, 19 Wash. 2d 607, 145 P.2d 244 (1944).
23 A. CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 541 (196o). See National Foundation, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 182 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.N.C. 196o); Sass v. Hank, io8 Cal. App. 2d
207, 238 P.2d 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); Washington Constr. Co. v. Spinella, 8
N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617 (1951); Temple v. Clinton Trust Co., I N.J. 219, 62 A.2d
690 (1948).
The decision in Allied, that the words of the credit agreement were too
ambiguous, has nonetheless been criticized as being a "strained interpretation."
Murray, A Legal-Empirical Study of the Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards, 21
U. MIAM1 L. REv. 811, 817 (1967).
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court may be guilty of an unauthorized variance or reformation of the
contract.43 In effect, this interpretation of the credit agreement renders
the cardholder a guarantor 44 for unauthorized purchases made on his
card.
If Sears can be interpreted as placing the cardholder in the position
of a guarantor, it can be argued that the decision contradicts the frequently stated principle that in contracts of guaranty, the promises of
an uncompensated guarantor must be strictly construed, and therefore,
the guarantor cannot be held liable beyond the strict terms of his contract.4 5 This principle has been recognized and applied in two credit

card cases, Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Roofing Co.4 6 and Union
Oil Co. v. Lull,47 with interesting results. In both cases express risk-

allocation provisions were held to place the cardholder in the position
of a guarantor for unauthorized purchases.4 8 The respective courts
reasoned that agreements of this type imply a reciprocal promise on the
part of the issuer to exercise reasonable diligence to protect the guarantor-holder. Lull supported this conclusion by recognizing that such
43When the Sears case was before the court of civil appeals, that court refused
to make an "unauthorized variance or reformation" of the terms of the Sears credit
agreement infavor of the cardholder by reading the proviso "with my authority"
into the agreement after the word "identification." Duke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
433 S.W. 2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). Neither the court of civil appeals
nor the supreme court appeared to realize, however, -that by implying an obligation
on the part of the cardholder for unauthorized purchases, they might be making
an unauthorized variance or reformation of the credit agreement in favor of Sears.
"For purposes of this comment, it is immaterial whether the term surety,
guarantor, or indemnitor would most accurately describe the relationship between
Sears and Duke. The cardholder will be referred to as the guarantor. It has been
held that no specific language is necessary to create a guaranty contract. Everts
v. Matteson, 21 Cal. 2d 437, 132 P.2d 476, 483 (1942); Beck v. Shepard Fruit Co.,
19 Cal. App. 2d 590, 66 P.2d 188, i9' (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); General Phoenix Corp.
v. Cabot, 3oo N.Y. 87, 89 N.E.2d 238, 242 (1949).
"E.g., Dunkirk Trust Co. v. Schmitt, 316 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1963); Puerto Rico
Indus. Dev. Co. v. John H. Miller Mfg. Corp., 17o F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Ill. 1959);
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Siegel, 36 N.J. Super. 207, 115 A.2d 152 (Monmouth
County Ct. 1955); Garfield Trust Co. v. Teichmann, 24 N.J. Super. 519, 95 A.2d
18 (Super. Ct. Div. 1953); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. McCoy, 96 Ore. 474, 190 P. 311
(1920). It has been said that uncompensated sureties, guarantors, and indemnitors
are favorites of the law. Burkhardt v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
127 Colo. 251, 256 P.2d 234 (1953); Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 22o Ore. 412, 349 P.2d
243 (1966); Hagey v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 16o Ore. 132, 126 P.2d
836 (1942).
"12o8 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945).
'122o Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243

(196o).

4In Gulf, a provision on the card itself stated that the holder "assumes full
responsibility for all merchandise, deliveries or service obtained on credit by any
person by its presentation," and that loss or theft of the card should be reported
immediately. 186 S.W.2d at 792, 794. For the contractual language on the card in
Lull see note 39 supra.
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agreements usually expose the guarantor to liability through the acts
of others over which he has little or no control.49 As a result, the cardholders in these cases were relieved of liability because the facts showed
that the issuer or its dealers had failed to meet either the standard of
care imposed by the guaranty nature of the credit agreement, 50 or to
sustain their burden of proving that they had met the required standard.51
Assuming that the credit agreement in Sears did contain an express
clause which operated to make the cardholder a guarantor, the Gulf
and Lull rationale, applied to the bipartite arrangement, would impose a high standard upon the issuer in credit transactions. The "ordinary care" requirement of Sears would not be sufficient.5 2 Rather,
the criterion should be whether the issuer exercised reasonable diligence to protect the cardholder-guarantor from unauthorized purchases. Such reasonable diligence would require more than mere possession of an ordinary credit card as identification. This is not an unreasonable requirement since the issuer is directly involved in all credit card transactions and not subject to liability because of the failures
of an agent or dealer as in a tripartite arrangement. 53 However, this
reasoning can only be speculative since no express provision exists in
the Sears agreement which can be strictly construed to place liability
on the cardholder. On the contrary, the court has placed the cardholder
in a position analogous to that of a guarantor merely by implying
terms in the credit agreement.
"349

P.2d at 250.

wGulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 2o8 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790, 794-95
(1945). Nor was there any sound or valid reason found in Gulf for invoking, the rule
of Wanamaker v. Megary, 24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Phila. Mun. Ct. 1915), that as between
two innocent parties the one who made the loss possible should bear it. Id. at
795. This contention has been rejected in other credit card cases. See Thomas
v. Central Charge Serv. Inc., 212 A.2d 533 (D.C. Ct. App. 1965); Lit. Bros. v.
Haines, 98 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24
Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. Lancaster County 1935).
aUnion Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243, 254 (iq6o). Thne court
admitted that there was no direct authority for placing the burden of proof
on the issuer. Id. However, the rules of evidence suggest that the holder should
bear the burden of proving the seller's negligence. See C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE
§ S318 (1954).
6Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 524 (1969).
'rhis is essentially the reasoning and conclusion reached in Allied although
no guaranty considerations were discussed in that case.
A similar principle, applied to contracts and promises which are aleatory in
character, holds that one who has incurred some degree of hazard or risk by
entering into a contract has a right that the other party to the contract will
do nothing to materially increase the degree of that hazard or risk. 3 A A. CORBIN,
CONTRArs § 732 (1960). See American Cas. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 138
(gth Cir. 1964); J. A. Fay & Co. v. James Jenks Co., 93 Mich. 130, 53 N.V. 163 (1892).
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In addition to analyses of credit provisions and application of
basic contract principles, it seems that courts have also been guided
by social policy considerations in relieving cardholders of liability. In
this respect, Allied, Gulf, and Lull all appear to exhibit some measure
of social conscience on behalf of the courts. These cases can be said to
reflect a realization that the issuer can best bear the burden of loss by
spreading those losses over all its transactions.5 4 Furthermore, the
benefits derived5 5 and the bargaining power of a credit card applicant
are small compared to that of the issuer, particularly where the applicant has little or no choice of credit provisions.5 6 While social policy
considerations are seldom expressly stated in a court's opinion,57 they
"This rationale has been suggested as the underlying consideration in some
courts' refusals to interpret risk-allocation clauses literally. See Macaulay, Private
Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1063 (1966); 23 WNAsH. & LE
L. REv. 125, 131 (1966).
rThe holder benefits by obtaining short term credit and instant purchasing
power with the issuer. He is thus relieved of carrying large amounts of cash.
However, the benefits derived from the relationship by the issuer seem greater
because the credit card arrangement facilitates increased patronage, and the cost
of processing and accounting can be shifted back to its customers in the form of
-higher prices.
The Allied court pointed out that an issuer "issues credit in order to
enlarge its reservoir of prospective sales." Allied Stores, Inc. v. Funderburke, 52
Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967). In Lull the court noted
that the issuer "received a benefit consisting of adding another potential customer
for the sale of its products by facilitating purchases through the convenient use of
credit." Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 22o Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243, 249-50 (1960). These statements by the courts appear to suggest that the issuer derives the greatest benefit
from the credit card relationship.
5The cardholder must accept the credit card under the issuer's terms or not
at all. In this respect a credit card contract or agreement is similar to an adhesion
contract. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion: Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 CoLuM. L. Ray. 629 (1943). A risk-shifting clause could easily be construed as being in the same category as an exculpatory provision. See 22 LA. L.
REv. 640 (1962). The courts are reluctant to uphold agreements containing
exculpatory clauses where the bargaining position of the party burdened with the
risk is relatively small compared with that of the exculpated party. 6A A.
CoRBIN, CoNrRAcrs § 1472 (1962); RESTATEIENT OF CoNraACrS § 575 (1932)-

It could be argued, however, that there is no great disparity of bargaining
power in the Sears situation, since a failure to sign the credit agreement would
not preclude a prospective cardholder from purchasing merchandise from Sears,
but only from buying on a revolving charge account.
-The Allied court did not choose to conceal its feelings in this regard when
it noted that "it is manifestly unfair to shift the burdens of [the issuer's] inadequacies or failure to the innocent consumer ....

" 277 N.Y.S.-d

at 15- When

the facts of a case are particularly appealing, a court guided by social policy
considerations could deftly apply contract principles, to reach the most equitable
result, and yet not be -heavily burdened by precedent in a following case where
the facts may not be so appealing. Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty
to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards,
19 VAND. L. REv. 1o51, 1o63 (1966).

